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Preface—As the year 2000 begins, congressional
conferrees face the task of resolving differences be-
tween “patient protection” bills passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate. In order to discuss the
principal issues facing policymakers and options for
reform, this paper begins by describing problems
raised by the federal law governing private-sector
employee health plans from a consumer perspective. It
discusses approaches proposed by the federal regula-
tors and the House and Senate to give consumers
greater ability to challenge health plan decisions,
focusing in particular on issues that arise should
Congress decide to give health plan participants
increased ability to sue for damages under state laws.
Employee health plan liability then is explored from the
perspectives of physicians, employers, and insurers
with regard to activities such as negotiating the terms
of contracts, improving the general quality of medical
care, assigning liability for medical errors, and deter-
mining who has the power to decide which procedures
and technologies are medically necessary. Finally,
possible approaches to health plan liability—ranging
from contract law to tort law notions of liability—are
presented in the context of the bills passed by House
and Senate in 1999.
Perhaps no issue facing Congress today has been
more divisive and difficult to resolve than reforming the
legal remedies available to people in employment-based
health plans who have been injured as a result of medi-
cal and administrative decisions made by plan sponsors,
administrators, insurers, and medical providers. Created
in the era of unfettered fee-for-service medicine, the
current legal structure largely insulates group health
plan sponsors as well as plan administrators and insurers
under contract with them from legal liability for cover-
age decisions even as many have exerted greater influ-
ence over medical professionals in order to contain costs
and promote efficient practices. Medical professionals
complain that, while they have less control over how
they practice medicine, they face exposure to malprac-
tice suits at the same time that managed care organiza-
tions (MCOs) that sometimes influence them to stint on
care are often legally insulated from liability. Plan
sponsors and managed care firms argue that exposing
them to increased liability will end up raising premiums,
both directly by lining the pockets of trial lawyers and
indirectly by hamstringing their ability to root out
inefficient medical practices, thereby causing more
employers stop offering health coverage and increasing
the number of uninsured Americans. Consumer advo-
cates argue that people in employer health plans who are
arbitrarily denied coverage or medical treatments prom-
ised in their health plan documents have inadequate legal
remedies to enforce those promises. Furthermore, they
point out, managed care companies and group medical
practices competing for business (and often facing the
expectations of shareholders as more convert to for-profit
status) have strong incentives to contain costs. Finally,
many courts have declared that current law offers inade-
quate legal protection from the consequences of deci-
sions made by health plans, even in cases where those
decisions were erroneous, negligent, or malicious; yet,
the courts say, there is little they can do because Con-
gress has bound their hands.
ERISA AND ITS EFFECTS
At the heart of the federal debate over restructuring
the legal liability for health care provided through
private-sector employee plans is the law governing such
plans: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).1 Enacted in response to highly publi-
cized incidents of fraud and mismanagement in pension
and employee benefit plans, ERISA created a detailed
regulatory scheme to ensure that employees receive
pension benefits promised to them by private-sector
employers and unions. In order to facilitate the adminis-
tration of pension and benefit plans and remove barriers
that otherwise might deter sponsors from offering them,
Congress preempted states from enforcing laws that
relate to these plans. In contrast to its treatment of
pensions, ERISA set down very few regulatory require-
ments regarding employee benefits such as health plans
(although more have been added in recent years).
Furthermore, in many instances where ERISA subjects
health plans to substantive requirements, such as its civil
enforcement provisions, they are arguably geared toward
resolving disputes over pension benefits and do not
always fit the needs of health plan participants.  With its
roots in trust law (as well as labor law), ERISA’s claims
appeal procedures and civil enforcement mechanisms
are aimed at making sure that plan fiduciaries handle
funds prudently over long time periods and deliver them
to participants. Most of its remedies are targeted at
safeguarding “plan” assets for the benefit of participants
collectively as opposed to protecting the interests of
individuals seeking to access services, such as medical
care, covered by the plan. The framers of these rules did
not anticipate that ERISA would end up becoming a
major feature of health care law and would influence the
shape of the health care delivery system.
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The protections available to group health plan
participants involved in disputes with health plans can
be viewed as a continuum: first involving internal
review, then external review, and finally judicial
review. ERISA currently has no requirement for
external, independent review of a plan denial of a
benefit, including medical treatment denied under a
utilization review program. A plan participant appeal-
ing a denial must go through an internal grievance
process before being able to access the courts. The law
states that every ERISA plan shall “afford a reasonable
opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits
has been denied for a full and fair review by the appro-
priate named fiduciary of the decision denying the
claim.”2 Under regulations further defining ERISA’s
claim procedure, the plan official must make a decision
on a claim within a reasonable period of time (but in no
event later than 90 days) after receiving the claim for
benefits.3 An extension of up to 90 more days is avail-
able for “special circumstances.” The plan may estab-
lish a reasonable time period of no less than 60 days in
which a claimant may request an appeal. According to
the regulations, an appeal decision is supposed to be
made promptly—not later than 60 days after the plan’s
receipt of the request for review or, if an extension is
required due to special circumstances, not later than
120 days after receipt of a request for review. Despite
the maximum length of time allowed for a claim
decision under the regulations, most employer plans
process claims far more expeditiously, according to
employer representatives. A denial must be in writing
and must detail the reason the claim was denied,
including references to the provision of the plan sup-
porting the denial. 
Once an ERISA plan’s internal grievance and
appeals process is exhausted, legal remedies available
to consumers in court are narrow, compared to state
law remedies. The law permits participants to seek
recovery of benefits in a federal court but does not
allow them to redress unreasonable delay, fraud,
malice, emotional distress, or other harms.4 Although
they can recover the denied benefit, participants cannot
recover actual out-of-pocket costs, such as additional
medical expenses or lost wages incurred as a conse-
quence of denied coverage. Perhaps most significant,
given the proliferation of preauthorization and concur-
rent review of medical care as common features of
health plans along with financial and other incentives
for physicians to practice more efficiently, ERISA
provides no remedy for injuries caused by denials of
treatment or payment, other than eventual provision of
the benefit promised in the plan documents.
The Department of Labor (DOL), which administers
ERISA, recently has argued that Section 5025 of the act
permits a plan participant or his or her estate to seek
restitution of savings garnered by a health insurer as a
consequence of wrongfully withholding medical treat-
ments in breach of its fiduciary duties. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, recently held that such
restitution was not an appropriate equitable remedy
under ERISA.6 (ERISA plan participants and other
parties also may sue plan administrators or other fiducia-
ries for breaches of fiduciary duty under Section 404; the
ability to pursue such actions serves important functions,
including setting future policy for a plan’s administra-
tion, but assets recovered under such suits typically are
remitted to the plan, not to individuals themselves. As
with Section 502 actions, individuals pressing suits for
fiduciary breach under ERISA cannot collect awards for
damages.)
Federal courts of appeals are divided on the issue of
whether ERISA preempts state lawsuits against MCOs
challenging the quality of the medical care provided by
their contracting physicians.7 A growing number of
federal courts hold that ERISA does not prohibit patients
from suing an MCO for vicarious liability of physicians
who are its agents. Thus, under the current state of the
law, if a court concludes that a person was injured by a
substandard medical decision, the plaintiff can sue the
clinician who made the decision as well as the MCO, if
it employs the clinician or exercises substantial control
over the clinician’s practice. But if the case is character-
ized as a coverage decision, ERISA confines plaintiffs
to recovering benefits per se.
In Corcoran v. United Healthcare,8 for example, the
court characterized a plan’s decision to deny hospital
care to a woman with a problem pregnancy (and instead
to supply several hours of daily home nursing care) to be
a determination about covered plan benefits. When the
fetus died, allegedly as a result of the mother’s not being
in a hospital setting, she could not recover damages for
this loss. As a practical matter in today’s market, it is
often difficult to determine where coverage decisions
end and medical acts and omissions begin or to what
degree they might overlap. In any event, an argument
can be made that in many instances a denial of coverage
means that a person will not receive the medical services
at issue, as many procedures are too expensive for an
individual to pay out of pocket.
Many argue that the regulations governing ERISA’s
claims process, which were promulgated in 1977, are
antiquated as far as health plans are concerned. When
the regulation was developed, disputes over benefits
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almost always involved payment by the plan after
services had been rendered. Managed care practices,
such as preauthorization of medical services and
capitation of physician services, were not widely used.9
Today, many disputes involve denial of medical care
itself. The length of the grievance process alone may
create a barrier for participants needing immediate
medical attention who are involved in disputes with
plans over benefit denials. Many of the suits that go to
court are brought by members of a deceased patient’s
family. A hypothetical “worst-case scenario” illustrates
the problem from the participant’s point of view: A
patient needs an expensive surgery. An insurer under-
going solvency problems denies the request on the
grounds of medical necessity in order to delay incurring
a major expense. The patient dies by the time the case
goes to court. The court rules that the patient was
entitled to the surgery under the contract, but the
patient is no longer alive. The family has no way to
collect damages both to compensate for wrongful death
and to deter company officials fromengaging in similar
behavior in the future.
After the limitations of ERISA’s claims procedures
and remedies gained attention in the context of growing
consumer discontent with managed care, the Clinton
administration established the President’s Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in
the Health Care Industry. The commission concluded
that all consumers should have a “right” to a fair and
efficient process to resolve disputes with health plans,
providers, and institutions serving them, including a
rigorous system of internal review and an independent
system of external review.10 The commission also
recommended that both the internal and external
appeals systems should resolve disputes in a timely
manner, with expedited consideration for decisions
involving emergency or urgent care consistent with
time frames that the Medicare program requires of its
risk contractors, and that external reviews be conducted
by appropriately credentialed professionals who were
not involved in the initial decision and have no conflict
of interest. The commission declined to make recom-
mendations on whether to expand ERISA plan partici-
pants’ legal remedies but noted that the issue needed to
be addressed.
Since the quality commission issued its recommen-
dations two years ago, the administration and congres-
sional Democrats, led by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-
Mass.) and Rep. John D. Dingell (D-Mich.), have
vigorously advocated giving ERISA plan participants
greater legal remedies as well as the rigorous type of
internal and external review requirements recommended.
President Clinton recently endorsed the compromise bill
introduced by Dingell and Rep. Charlie Norwood (D-
Ga.) that includes expanded remedies for participants
and beneficiaries covered by ERISA plans. While
amenable to increased internal and external review
requirements, Republican leaders in both houses of
Congress have opposed added court remedies. House
Republicans, who hold a slim majority, were split on the
liability issue, however. Norwood, a dentist, and Rep.
Greg Ganske (D-Iowa), a surgeon, are among the
strongest supporters of patients’ rights legislation in the
House, and they brought along enough of their Republi-
can colleagues to ensure the expanded court remedies
were included in the House bill over the objection of the
leadership. The House Republican leadership, in turn,
has excluded Norwood and Ganske from the conference
committee that will attempt to reconcile differences with
the Senate on the patient protection legislation.
CONSUMER ISSUES
From a consumer perspective the appeals procedures
and court remedies available under ERISA present a
series of intertwined problems, including the following:
 Timeliness—The time frames afforded by ERISA’s
internal review requirements and legal remedies can
have damaging consequences, even if a consumer or
his estate ultimately prevails in court in claiming a
denied benefit. 
 Lack of independent administrative structure to
assist consumers in resolving coverage disputes—As
noted above, ERISA contains no requirement for
independent administrative review of health coverage
disputes relating to any issue (for example, interpre-
tation of contract language or disputes over medical
necessity, access to specialists or medical facilities,
or simply determination of whether promised bene-
fits were arbitrarily or wrongfully denied).
If an independent review process were established, a
key issue that arises is what qualifies as an appealable
benefit denial. For example, if the process limited
denials that could be appealed to an independent
reviewer to matters pertaining to medical necessity,
many denials that might result in harm could be
unappealable, even in cases that actually involved
medical necessity but were characterized as some-
thing else.11 (The Senate bill would confine external
review to medical necessity and experimental deci-
sions, while under the House bill any decision that
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involved a medical judgment could go to external
review.) Therefore, the issue of who decides which
benefit denials might qualify for appeal to an inde-
pendent reviewer is critical. Some state regulators
administering external review programs and the
administrator of the review organization used by the
Medicare risk program have pointed out that, for
such a system to work, there needs to be a broad
definition of appealable items. They and others also
say that consumers need assistance in sorting out and
framing legal and medical issues.
 Lack of legal remedy to enforce plan promises and
contracts made to uphold those promises—As
described above, under the current system, if the
ERISA appeals process and ensuing court case
eventually succeed in overturning the plan denial,
but the patient’s need for the disputed benefit no
longer exists due to his or her death or medical
deterioration, the participant has no legal remedy.
 Procedural impediments—In order to sue for equita-
ble relief, an ERISA plan participant first must
exhaust the internal appeal process. Plan partici-
pants, who may be ill during the appeals process,
carry a heavy burden of proving that plan adminis-
trators have ruled improperly in making a benefit
denial. When a participant sues for equitable relief
in federal court, the court generally will not accept
new medical evidence, but rather will rule whether
the plan fiduciary’s decision to deny a benefit was
“arbitrary and capricious,” given the information
available at the time of the decision. Under this
standard, a person seeking to overcome a denial of
a treatment on the basis that is was not medically
necessary could not introduce the testimony of the
world’s leading authorities in the relevant medical
specialty if such evidence had not been introduced
in the plan appeal procedure. 
Because a court may or may not award attorneys’
fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such cases and be-
cause damage awards are not available, lawyers are
often reluctant to take them on, making it difficult
for people to find representation. In addition, courts
may not award attorneys’ fees for time spent repre-
senting a participant in the claims process leading
up to the legal proceeding.12
 Lack of standards governing what is promised in
ERISA health plans, including definition of what is
medically necessary—Most consumers are ignorant
of the exclusionary language in health plan docu-
ments and the details in contracts with insurers and
providers controlling their access to benefits prom-
ised. Plans usually reserve the right to deny coverage
of treatments that are not medically necessary or are
experimental. Health plans currently define medical
necessity in a wide variety of ways. 
Some analysts have advanced the case that federal
standards are needed to ensure that plan denials on
the grounds of medical necessity must be justified on
the basis of expert medical opinion and scientific
findings, where such evidence is available.13 Further-
more, they argue that standards of medical necessity
in ERISA health plan documents should never be
decided arbitrarily—that is, at the sole discretion of
plan fiduciaries, as would be possible under some
legislative proposals.14
PROPOSED CLAIMS REGULATIONS
The Labor Department is in the process of revamping
its claims procedure requirements but has yet to issue a
final rule. On September 9, 1998, DOL issued proposed
regulations that substantially revise the minimum
procedural standards for handling the internal appeals
process for benefit claims under ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans. The proposed regulations create
new maximum time frames for decision making; new
disclosure requirements; new notice requirements; new
standards of review on appeal; consequences for failing
to establish and follow reasonable claims procedures;
and other changes.15 For urgent claims, plan administra-
tors would have to make initial coverage decisions
within 72 hours. Employers and insurers have expressed
many concerns about the proposed regulations, includ-
ing concerns about added costs, increased complexity,
and difficulty of administration.
The proposed regulation uses the term “adverse
benefit determination” instead of “denial of a claim.”
The broader concept is important for participants in
group health plans because it encompasses not only
refusals to pay for services but also terminations of or
refusals or denials of treatment by a utilization review
organization and refusals to precertify coverage under a
plan. In addition, the proposed regulation treats as
adverse benefit determinations plan decisions that a
benefit is not medically necessary or appropriate,
experimental, or investigational.
In a request for information before DOL issued the
proposed changes, the department noted that the current
regulation was drafted in response to concern about plan
practices that existed prior to the passage of ERISA,
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particularly with respect to participants’ lack of infor-
mation about claims procedures generally. The current
regulation makes no distinction between pension and
health plans. The department also noted that many
changes since have occurred in the health care market-
place, in health policy, and in business communica-
tions. In broaching its concern about “timely resolution
of requests for medical treatment from group health
plans,” the Labor Department also pointed to Medi-
care’s expedited review process as a possible model.16
While considering changes to ERISA plans’ internal
grievance process requirements, DOL officials have
publicly stated that they have no jurisdiction to require
external review of plan decisions. Such a requirement
would require an act of Congress.
Discussing the proposed claim procedure DOL was
about to publish before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, Olena Berg, then assistant
secretary of DOL’s Pension and Welfare Benefits Ad-
ministration (PWBA), testified in May 1998 that the
department considered it within its regulatory authority to
 Make clear that a benefit denial includes adverse
determinations under a utilization review program;
denials of access to (or reimbursement for) medical
services; denials of access to (or reimbursement for)
specialists; and any decision that a service, treat-
ment, drug, or other benefit is not medically
necessary.
 Require that benefit claims and appeals involving
urgent care be processed with a time frame appro-
priate to the medical emergency, but no more than
72 hours.
 Require, with respect to non-urgent claims, that the
plan either decide the claim or notify the claimant
that the claim is incomplete within 15 days of
receiving the claim (claimants then would have at
least 45 days to provide any information to com-
plete the claim and, once complete, the claim would
have to be decided within 15 days).
 Require that, if a non-urgent claim is denied, the
claimant be afforded at least 180 days to appeal and
that a decision on the appealed claim be made
within 30 days of receipt of the appeal by the plan.
 Require consultation with qualified medical profes-
sionals in deciding appeals involving medical
judgments.
 Require that appealed claims be reviewed de novo
(that is, review may not be limited to information
and documents considered in the initial claims
denial) and be decided by a party other than the party
who made the original claim determination.
However, according to Berg and other administration
officials, bolstering ERISA’s internal claims procedure is
not enough to adequately protect consumers. DOL Associ-
ate Solicitor for Plan Benefits Security Marc I. Machiz has
testified that, while the department can promulgate a more
protective claim processing regulation, it cannot assure
compliance with that regulation if no cost is imposed on
plans for failing to comply. According to Machiz:
Under current law, a plan fiduciary who fails to assure
compliance with the time limits or notice provisions of
our current regulation, or any future regulation, is not
accountable for that failure. At best, an aggrieved
participant may treat the claim as denied and proceed
to court, still without the benefit of a clear explanation
of his denial or access to pertinent documents that
might help him evaluate or prove his claim. Perhaps
after wasting critically important weeks attempting to
avail himself of the plan’s claims procedures, he may
find himself in court with his health already injured
and his need for treatment mooted by the progress of
his illness, or even death. If the plan’s delay in provid-
ing a decision, or recalcitrance in providing critical
information causes injury, the participant has no
recourse, and the responsible fiduciary suffers no
consequences.17
Because of financial incentives to delay providing costly
medical treatment and the limited ability of revamping the
internal grievance process to strengthen consumer protec-
tion, the Labor Department has advocated that Congress
increase the legal remedies available to ERISA plan
participants injured by denials of medical care. In addition,
the department has urged Congress to enact legislation
providing independent, external review of plan decisions.
Limits of DOL Consumer Assistance under
Current Law
Under its authority to protect private-sector employee
welfare plans, DOL can investigate complaints regarding
employer or union health plan conduct and file suit to
impose fines or an injunction. ERISA, however, does
not explicitly empower DOL to pursue court cases or
administrative remedies on behalf of individuals disput-
ing health plan benefit denials.18 In the past, DOL’s
PWBA (which administers compliance with ERISA)
kept coverage disputes between health plan participants
and plan fiduciaries at an arm’s length for two stated
reasons. According to PWBA officials, ERISA does not
authorize the department to sue on behalf of an individ-
ual in such cases involving coverage disputes unless a
benefit denial affects the plan’s entire membership.
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Furthermore, PWBA officials said that they lacked the
manpower to investigate individual complaints. During
the past four years, PWBA has added considerable staff
to respond to benefit inquiries of all kinds. PWBA
benefit advisors now regularly review individual
disputes over health coverage and try to resolve them.19
If talking with the plan sponsors does not resolve a
coverage dispute or other issue, DOL may advise
participants of their legal options or refer them to legal
aid organizations or other sources of legal assistance,
where available. As before, the department will not to
go to court on behalf of an individual in a benefit
dispute that does not involve some overarching legal
issue or impact the larger plan membership.
As interpreted by the courts, two of ERISA’s
provisions serve to define and limit the legal options of
plan participants to sue health plans for denials of
medical coverage and treatments.  These are Section
502, which sets out ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme,
and Section 514, which preempts states from enforcing
laws relating to ERISA plans (but allows states to
continue regulating the business of insurance).  In the
Pilot Life20 case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
ERISA preempted state common law damages claims
against the insurer of an ERISA disability plan for two
reasons. First, the Court ruled that the common law
claims were not saved from preemption under ERISA’s
Section 514 as part of a state’s effort to regulate insur-
ance. Second, and perhaps more important, the Court
said that state law remedies were preempted on grounds
that Congress intended ERISA’s civil enforcement
scheme to be ERISA plan participants’ exclusive
means of remedying benefit denials.21 As described
earlier, Section 502 offers individuals in private-sector
health plans what is basically a “right to sue” to compel
plan administrators to render denied benefits promised
in plan documents, but ERISA contains no provision to
authorize courts to award damage to compensate
individuals for lost wages, additional health care costs,
or pain and suffering, nor does it contain provisions
allowing punitive damages to be awarded.
As noted above, ERISA health plan participants that
go to court face a variety of procedural and legal
obstacles in suing to gain denied benefits. Under
ERISA’s fiduciary standards, for example, plan fiducia-
ries are responsible for the collective interests of plan
participants. Plan fiduciaries must act prudently and
according to plan documents. Although failure to pay
a valid claim or authorize promised medical treatment
may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, courts
ordinarily uphold the fiduciary’s decision unless
participants can prove the decision was “arbitrary and
capricious.”22 Where a plan administrator has discretion-
ary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or
interpret plan terms, courts will overturn the administra-
tor’s decision only if is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion.23 In such cases, when the issue involves
whether a denied medical treatment is medically neces-
sary, courts will generally not consider new evidence
about the medical efficacy of the treatment, but rather
will rule on whether a fiduciary made a prudent deci-
sion, given the information before it at the time it made
that decision. Therefore, in order to pursue such cases in
the courts effectively, participants must be sure that
medical evidence in support of approving the requested
medical treatment be presented during the internal
appeal process. However, failing to realize that they may
have to establish their case sufficiently during the
internal appeals process to prevail later in court, people
may not be represented by an attorney at this stage of the
dispute. Most people, of course, do not understand the
minutiae of ERISA’s appeals process and case law.
Arbitrary and capricious behavior on the part of ERISA
fiduciaries may include (a) using undisclosed medical
criteria that are more restrictive than those used by other
insurers, (b) basing a denial on an ambiguous provision
in a benefit document, or (c) failing to comply with
ERISA’s internal appeals requirements if that failure
prevents a participant from requesting a reconsideration
of an adverse benefit determination.24
HOUSE AND SENATE BILLS
Both the House and Senate passed patient protection
bills during 1999; a conference committee of members
of both chambers has yet to reconcile the differences
between them. In many ways, the bills take differing
approaches toward regulating managed care practices,
providing opportunities for appealing plan decisions,
and limiting or expanding plan participants’ court
remedies in terms of both substance and the extent to
which state law may be applied. Both the House and
Senate bills would introduce a series of new federal
patient protections, including bans on “gag clauses”;
requirements for access to emergency services and to
obstetric, gynecological, pediatric, and specialist care;
and rules regarding continuity of coverage, point-of-
service options, prescription drug formularies, and
clinical trials. The House bill would apply these provi-
sions to all ERISA health plans (both insured and self-
insured plans)25 as well as state and local government
plans. The Senate bill would apply these types of
provisions only to ERISA plans that were not fully
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insured and leave it up to the states to set these types of
standards for fully insured ERISA health plans.26 Both
bills would apply new disclosure rules to both self-
insured and fully insured ERISA plans. The Senate bill
would require both self-insured and insured plans
(including state and local government plans) to provide
inpatient coverage for certain breast cancer treatments
(if they provide medical/surgical benefits) and not to
discriminate based on genetic information.27
Both the House and Senate bills would apply new
claims and external review procedures to both insured
and self-insured ERISA health plans (the House bill
would also apply to non-ERISA plans). Both bills
would apply civil penalties for failures to follow the
external review procedures; decisions rendered under
these procedures would be binding on plans. While the
Senate bill would not expand liability, the House bill
would amend ERISA’s preemption clause to allow plan
participants, beneficiaries, or their estates to sue under
state law to recover damages “resulting from personal
injury or for wrongful death” against any person in
connection with the provision of insurance, administra-
tive services, or medical services by or for the group
health plan. In order to bring a state lawsuit, the plain-
tiff would have to suffer personal injury and have to
complete the internal and external appeals unless the
injury (or death) had already occurred. Under the
House bill, punitive damages would not be available in
instances where the plan complied with the external
review procedures and rulings, except in wrongful
death cases where punitive damages were all that were
available under state law. Group health plans, employ-
ers, or other plan sponsors would be liable under a state
cause of action only to the extent that they exercised
discretionary authority on a claim for benefits covered
under the plan (and that action resulted in personal
injury or wrongful death). Lawsuits could not be
undertaken for injuries resulting from decisions to
include or exclude a particular benefit from the plan or
to provide extracontractual benefits. (The latter excep-
tion might present a problem of equal treatment under
a plan if it provided an incentive for plan sponsors to
draft plan documents to exclude certain benefits or
treatments and then informally approve them for some
employees but not others.)
By imposing external review processes, both the
House and Senate bills attempt to reduce the risk of
medical injury that people in group health plans might
face due to administrative or medical decisions by plan
administrators and insurers currently shielded from
legal liability. The House bill, however, provides plan
administrators and insurers with an added incentive to
adhere to review procedures by amplifying their legal
liability if they fail to do so. Depending on what court
remedies are available in a particular state, the House
bill also may provide consumers with a mechanism for
winning compensatory damages (such as lost wages or
payment of additional medical bills) in cases where they
can prove that they were injured by actions or decisions
taken by plan administrators, insurers, and medical
professionals. Viewed one way, creating a mechanism
for compensating patients for damages may be necessary
if plan sponsors or their agents attempt to change the
practice of medicine and join physicians in making
medical decisions. However, viewed another way,
imposing too much liability on plan sponsors may
simply drive many out of the business of purchasing
health coverage with an eye toward improving the
quality of care. Indeed, many employers have said they
will terminate their health plans if they face increased
liability, and some are exploring the possibility of
scaling back their involvement to giving employees a
“contribution” toward health insurance that would be
purchased by each individual.28
By stripping back ERISA’s preemption provision to
allow certain state causes of action, eventual passage of
the House version would represent a departure from
existing policy by Congress in giving state courts and
legislatures a new role in indirectly enforcing access to
benefits in ERISA plans, both insured and self-insured.
As noted above, the courts have ruled that ERISA’s civil
enforcement scheme totally preempts state law with
regard to resolving disputes over benefits. In its original
design, ERISA preempts states from enforcing laws that
relate to private-sector employee benefit plans while
allowing states to regulate insurers contracting with the
plans.29 Responding in part to the dual regulatory field
that ERISA’s original preemption structure created,
Congress changed its approach to preemption somewhat
in enacting the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Under the regulatory
structure created in HIPAA, Congress sets federal
minimum standards through ERISA, the tax code, and
the Public Health Service Act upon which states may
build if their laws are consistent with the federal statute.
Leaving a major facet of enforcement of plan behavior
up to state discretion is a new development and runs
against ERISA’s principle of establishing a federal
standard or at least a minimum federal standard for
participants in federally defined (and tax-advantaged)
employee benefit plans. In a practical sense, this means
that different employees in the same ERISA plan
operating in more than one state may have different
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court remedies, given the same actions taken by plan
fiduciaries such as administrators or insurers. It also
means that more of such cases will end up in state
courts as opposed to federal courts. An alternative
approach (assuming one accepts the threshold argument
that increased court remedies are needed) would be to
create a federal cause of action for damages that would
be available to members of group health plans, either
allowing certain state causes of action as supplements
or continuing to preempt them.
How much latitude the states might have to regulate
claims processing or impose external review require-
ments for insurers and MCOs contracting with ERISA
plans is also a key issue for congressional conferees.
Virtually all state insurance departments have well-
established mechanisms for overseeing the handling of
health insurance claims. Thirty states and the District of
Columbia have established external review require-
ments.30 Most of these laws were enacted during the
past few years in response to consumer concerns over
managed care practices. There is great variation among
state external review requirements, including differ-
ences in who must perform the reviews, whether
decisions are binding, what is eligible for review, and
who has access to information (as well as whether
reviewable issues must exceed a cost threshold and
whether filing fees are required). As noted below,
whether ERISA preempts such laws has been chal-
lenged in the courts.
Both the House and the Senate bills would authorize
new civil penalties. Under the Senate bill, DOL could
assess a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for failure or
refusal to comply with external review time lines or the
external review determination.31 Under the House ver-
sion, a person who caused the plan or insurance issuer to
refuse to comply with an external review decision may be
liable to the participant for civil penalties of up to $1,000
a day until the benefit is provided. The appropriate
federal agency could also assess civil penalties for
repeated refusals to authorize benefits required by the
external review entity or to comply with external review
requirements (in the amount of the lesser of 25 percent of
the value of the benefits not provided or $500,000) and
remove the responsible person from his or her position.
Under the House bill, participants and beneficiaries could
not bring lawsuits under ERISA to enforce some new
regulatory requirements, such as choice of coverage
options and other rules relating to the relationship be-
tween physicians and patients, but DOL could still take
enforcement actions. Participants could bring suits under
ERISA to enforce other new rights, such as access to
specialty and emergency care, although relief would be
limited to the value of benefits denied plus attorneys fees.
It is perhaps worth noting that the House bill does not
open up state court remedies to non-ERISA employee
health plan participants that do not already have them;
such people include federal employees, dependents, and
annuitants (among them, members of Congress and
federal regulators enforcing ERISA) covered in the
Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) program.
The court remedies available under current law to people
covered under FEHB are quite similar to those under
ERISA. Although FEHB has many characteristics that
arguably lessen the degree of risk faced by plan partici-
pants from injuries caused by plan administrators (for
example, more choice of plans, a solid financing base in
the tax system, a great deal of public visibility, and
politically powerful plan members), an argument also
can be made that establishing similar remedies for
FEHB as for private-sector plans could provide federal
policymakers with valuable experience and information
about the cost and efficacy of new external review
requirements and legal remedies. (Doing this could also
give federal policymakers increased sensitivity to issues
that might arise and need later adjustment as all parties
involved began adapting to the new system.)
OTHER OBSTACLES TO SUING
HEALTH PLANS
If ERISA preemption were stripped back to allow
certain types of lawsuits to proceed against plan admin-
istrators, insurers, and MCOs, several obstacles still
might prevent patients from pursuing such court actions.
Among these barriers (this is by no means an exhaustive
list) are the common law of independent contractors,
corporate practice of medicine laws, and state reforms to
malpractice laws.
Independent Contractor Law
As noted earlier, in some federal courts plaintiffs
have been able to pursue claims of vicarious liability
against MCOs under contract with ERISA plans, in
essence suing the MCO on the grounds that it is indi-
rectly responsible for the medical malpractice of its
physicians. But breaching the ERISA preemption barrier
is just step one for such lawsuits to succeed. Virtually all
courts have held that MCOs (and hospitals) are not
responsible for the actions of independent contractors.32
Most MCOs contract with physicians instead of employ-
ing them (and physicians usually contract with many
MCOs simultaneously). The most likely targets among
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MCOs for vicarious medical malpractice lawsuits
would be staff-model HMOs, but these are rare. When
an HMO contracts with physician associations, the
HMO may be held liable for negligent medical care if
the patient perceives that the HMO is providing the
medical care under the “ostensible agency” theory of
law.33 It is easier for such an argument to prevail if a
court determines that an HMO represented the contract-
ing physician to be its employee, if the patient looked
to the HMO rather than the physician to act as its health
care provider, and if the patient had no choice in
selecting a treating physician.
Corporate Practice of Medicine Laws
While general common law theories provide state
court remedies for MCO actions that injure consumers,
in many states the “corporate practice of medicine”
defense may bar such lawsuits.34 Physicians have long
resisted control of medical decision making by persons
and organizations outside their profession for reasons
including the protection of their economic interests and
professional autonomy as well as concern for the
quality of care for patients. From 1912 to 1979 (when
federal antitrust regulators forced a change in policy),
the American Medical Association’s (AMA’s) ethical
standards declared that it was unprofessional for
physicians to work for a corporation. In response to
such concerns many states passed laws prohibiting
corporate control of the practice of medicine in a
variety of ways. Corporate practice of medicine is
banned in about half of the states, based on statutes,
court opinions, and state attorney general interpreta-
tions of physician licensure laws (and physicians,
insurers, and other parties go through complex legal
maneuvering to circumvent those proscriptions).
Although it is not clear whether the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine would bar medical malpractice
suits against MCOs in all states where the doctrine
remains viable, it had been held to bar negligence cases
in some states, including Missouri and Texas, which
are among the handful whose legislatures have recently
enacted laws specifically allowing such lawsuits to
proceed.
Drawing a distinction made by many other federal
courts between decisions over coverage (which involve
interpreting an ERISA plan’s terms) and medical care,
a federal district court upheld part of the Texas MCO
liability statute, which created a right to sue for both
health plan “health care treatment decisions” and
coverage denials or delays. The Texas court held that
ERISA would not preempt cases under the state law
alleging a health plan’s direct involvement in medical
treatment, but noted that ERISA would still preempt
cases brought under the law regarding coverage deci-
sions. The Texas court also held that an external review
program that is an integral part of the Texas liability law
was preempted by ERISA. The case is on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Republican presidential
candidate George W. Bush has said that he could
support a federal law allowing patients to sue MCOs if
it resembled the liability law that was enacted during his
term as governor of Texas.35)
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned state-level
barriers, in the absence of ERISA preemption, health
insurers and MCOs would probably be sued far more
often for both improper coverage decisions and medical
malpractice. For example, a California jury awarded $89
million in damages ($77 million of which was for
punitive damages) to the estate of Nelene Fox based on
claims of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The case was later settled for $5
million before appellate review. This lawsuit (Fox v.
HealthNet36) succeeded in part because it involved a
government-sponsored health plan not subject to
ERISA37 (or other federal laws governing federally
sponsored health programs that limit state-based reme-
dies). If Fox had been covered by a private-sector plan
subject to ERISA, it is extremely unlikely that there
would have been any recovery. In this case, Fox under-
went two radical mastectomies and conventional chemo-
therapy after being diagnosed with breast cancer. After
the cancer metastacized to her bone marrow, she sought
treatment involving a bone marrow transplant for which
HealthNet denied coverage, based on its determination





In recent years, health coverage arrangements and the
medical delivery system have become increasingly
complex, increasing possibilities for confusion and
distrust on the part of consumers and physicians. Corpo-
rate health plan sponsors and insurers have struggled to
slow the growth of health care costs, experimenting with
new benefit packages and ways of contracting with
physicians and other health care providers. Many
physicians, in turn, have developed, joined, or affiliated
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with new types of organizations. Increasingly fewer
work in solo practice but many still do. By 1995,
94,000 physicians worked in groups with between three
and 15 physicians and 117,000 practiced in larger
organizations, while two-thirds of the nation’s 613,000
physicians worked on their own or in two-physician
partnerships.38
In a new book describing the growth of physician
group practices and other forms of medical delivery
systems along with contractual and administrative
innovations (which he generally refers to as “virtual
integration”), economist James C. Robinson evaluates
the benefits of this ongoing organizational transforma-
tion and notes that it has created a great deal of confu-
sion not only for insurers and providers but also for
consumers, purchasers, regulators, and legislators.
According to Robinson:
Virtual integration in health care encompasses this ever-
changing multiplicity of relationships between insurers
and providers, including fee-for-service contracts with
individual providers, capitated contracts with provider
organizations, and every possible contractual hybrid.
There exists no one best relationship between insurers
and physicians, no ideal payment methodology, no final
allocation of responsibility for utilization and quality.
Purchasers and consumers differ in the networks and
products they want to buy while physicians and physi-
cian organizations differ in the risks and responsibilities
they want to assume.39
The complexity and dynamism of the new relationships
and ways of doing business in the health care market-
place increase the difficulty that policymakers face in
sorting out who should be legally responsible for doing
what, what should be regulated by government, and
what government should leave alone.
Physicians: Key Players
In the course of media coverage of the “managed
care backlash” and policy debates over giving patients
greater access to external review procedures and the
courts, the focal point is often the consumer or the
patient. But in terms of the political muscle actually
applied to state and federal legislators and regulators,
consumers and patients are typically far less strongly
represented than the lobbies representing parties such
as insurers, employers, trial lawyers, and medical
providers, all of whom have more concentrated eco-
nomic interests in health care transactions. In many
ways, the fight over liability is a subset of a much
larger battle over how to contain medical cost inflation
and, toward that end and others, how to reconfigure the
structure of the health financing and delivery system.
As employers, MCOs, and other organizations have
attempted to exert more control over the practice of
medicine (in part to gain control of utilization of re-
sources) and driven tougher bargains over the price of
services, physicians have expressed increasing discon-
tent and have played a pivotal role in shaping the patient
protection packages in Congress and state legislatures.
As noted above, among those leading the drive for
expanded liability for MCOs in the House were con-
gressmen who also are health care providers.
Several analysts have commented on physician
discontent with managed care. An interesting perspec-
tive on physician anxiety relating to contracts with
MCOs and malpractice liability has been advanced by
Bryan A. Liang, M.D., J.D., who notes:
Physicians, lodged in the middle between MCOs and
patients, have severely conflicting incentives. On the one
hand, they have a professional and ethical responsibility
to provide the appropriate amount of care consonant with
patient needs; further, they have a legal imperative to do
so since they shoulder virtually all the potential liability
for patient injury. (n282) On the other hand, financial
pressures and the threat of deselection directly contra-
vene their ability to provide or even suggest the level of
care they deem appropriate. Referrals, experimental
treatments, and treatments not covered by the MCO may
be extremely difficult to procure under these circum-
stances.(n283) Simply put, being an advocate for and
attempting to fulfill ethical obligations to patients can get
a physician fired.(n284)40
A board member of the Health Administration Responsi-
bility Project, which supports expanded court remedies
for ERISA health plan participants, Liang maintains that
physician liability for medical malpractice combined
with independent contractor status creates misaligned
incentives. Pointing out that the independent contractor
relationship insulates MCOs from liability in most
instances, Liang argues that MCOs can exert a great deal
of influence over contracting physicians’ treatment
practices because the doctors, who depend on MCOs to
obtain patients, fear “deselection” under contracts
containing termination-without-cause clauses. Physician
lobby groups have made a similar case against MCOs’
contracting practices, arguing that physicians are not in
an economic position to influence the content of con-
tracts and are subject to being terminated without cause.
Liang makes the following argument:
Organizationally, if MCOs were responsible for costs
associated with patient injury, they would have an
incentive to use their large patient and physician base
to investigate what causes error in medicine and what
structural and systematic changes could reduce the risk
of error, as other complex industries have done.
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He goes on to propose not only removing the ERISA
preemption barriers to court remedies but also changing
federal law to declare contracting physicians to be what
he terms “independent employees” of MCOs for the
purposes of civil actions (thereby overcoming the law of
independent contractors barrier) as well as banning
MCOs from terminating physician contracts without
cause; he would apply these reforms to coverage received
under all medical plans, not just those subject to ERISA.
In a somewhat related development, frustration with
MCOs has driven some physicians to consider unionizing
in order to improve their bargaining position. Antitrust
law now prevents those operating as independent contrac-
tors from colluding to set prices. Rep. Tom Campbell (R-
Calif.) is sponsoring a bill that would grant physicians
and other health care professionals negotiating contracts
with health plans the same treatment under antitrust laws
as bargaining units recognized under the National Labor
Relations Act and would deem such contractors to be
“employee(s) engaged in concerted activities.” Endorsed
by the AMA and strongly opposed by insurers and
employers, Campbell’s bill (H.R. 1304) has yet to be
formally considered by the House Judiciary Committee




Faced with proposals to strip back the liability
shield offered by ERISA, employers sponsoring health
plans, health insurers, and MCOs argue that doing so
will increase costs and drive many employers to termi-
nate their health plans and that both effects of these will
increase the number of uninsured Americans. They also
argue that increased liability coupled with more federal
managed care regulations will hamstring efforts by
group purchasers to improve the quality of medical
care. In making their case at congressional hearings,
employers and insurers have emphasized the high level
of medical error and suboptimal care now being offered
throughout the medical system and have cited as
evidence the high degree of regional variability in
medical practice. In making these points, some large
employers and insurers seem to be saying that they
would like to exert more influence over medical
practice. Exposing them to lawsuits might undercut
their willingness to do so. On the other hand, an
argument might be posed that, with the exception of a
few large employers and employer coalitions, most
employers so far have focused primarily on price and
have paid little attention to quality issues when negotiat-
ing contracts with MCOs.
Substandard Care and Medical Errors
Mounting evidence of substandard care and resulting
medical injury clearly presents a problem for large
employers facing the possibility of greater liability for
administrative and medical decisions. A highly publi-
cized report just released by the Institute of Medicine,
for example, estimates that as many as 98,000 Ameri-
cans die unnecessarily every year as a result of medical
mistakes made by physicians, pharmacists, and other
health care professionals.41 When coupled with nonfatal
consequences of other medical errors, these episodes
cost the nation as much as $29 billion a year.
While health plan denials of care have received much
publicity, MCOs have also identified many instances in
which physicians undertreat patients. For example, a
senior official in the UnitedHealth Group (United
Healthcare is its health plan business) testified before
Congress that the company used its databases to com-
pare the practice patterns of its contracted physicians
with established standards of medical care and found
significant underuse of several treatments for which
compliance rates should approach 100 percent.42 These
findings included the following:
 Only 62 percent of eligible patients received ACE
(angiotensin converting enzyme) inhibitors for their
congestive health failure (using this drug for a weak
heart that cannot pump blood adequately has im-
proved outcomes, according to studies reviewed by
the American College of Cardiology and the Agency
for Health Care Policy and Research).
 Only 71 percent of heart attack patients received a
beta blocker medication (which reduces the chance
of a second heart attack by 20 to 40 percent).
 Only 71 percent of diabetics had their control of blood
sugar levels measured with two glycated hemoglobins
per year (this test is the most accurate method to ensure
that diabetics are keeping their sugar levels low enough
to prevent long term complications).
Citing studies of the frequency of hysterectomies and the
prescribing of antibiotics, the UnitedHealth Group
executive testified that overuse of inappropriate proce-
dures is just as common as underuse of appropriate ones.
A literature review conducted by researchers from
RAND found large gaps between the care people should
receive and the care they actually receive (the authors
looked at studies of three generic types of care: preventive,
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acute, and chronic).43 The researchers found that on
average the preventive care studies that they reviewed
showed that only about 50 percent of people received
recommended care. An average of 70 percent of patients
received recommended acute care while 30 percent
received contraindicated acute care (care that should not
have been delivered). For chronic conditions, 60 percent
of patients received recommended care and 20 percent
received contraindicated care. (The authors noted that
these “values do not indicate exact levels of quality in the
United States, but they do provide a quantitative sense of
how much could be done in all areas to identify and
eliminate overuse and underuse of care.”)
While identifying several types of procedures for
which people should have been treated but did not
receive treatment, the RAND study also found in-
stances where surgery was performed on people who
did not need it:
A study of seven managed care organizations re-
vealed that about 16 percent of hysterectomies per-
formed during a one-year period from 1989 to 1990
were carried out for inappropriate reasons. An addi-
tional 25 percent were done for reasons of uncertain
clinical benefit.44 There are also examples of patients
who need surgery but do not receive it. In a study of
four hospitals, 43 percent of patients with a positive
exercise stress test demonstrating the need for coro-
nary angiography had received it within 3 months; 56
percent had received it within 12 months45.46
One study documented that 1 percent of hospitaliza-
tions in New York state resulted in an “adverse event”
due to negligence. (Adverse events were defined as
injuries caused by medical management of a disease
rather than the disease itself). Another found an adjusted
rate of preventable adverse drug reactions in two Boston
hospitals of 1.8 per 100 admissions, with 20 percent of
these classified as life-threatening. Concluding that their
most striking finding is how little systematic knowledge
is available about the quality of American health care
delivery, the RAND researchers provided evidence that
a great deal of the medical care people receive falls below
conventional standards of appropriateness. To what
degree this unevenness leads to excessive costs and
patient injury in not known, they said.
Utilization Review and Denials
Although MCOs may be exerting more influence over
physicians than in the past, explicit denials of care occur
for only a small fraction of medical transactions. Al-
though little national data are available on the frequency
of MCO coverage denials, one widely cited study found
that physicians surveyed in 1995 reported that the propor-
tion of patients initially denied coverage for recommended
services was always less than 6 percent for all forms of
care surveyed, while the final denial rate (after plan
officials often reversed decisions) was at most 3 percent.47
Mental health, substance abuse, and referral to a specialist
were the types of coverage most frequently denied. Denial
rates for other types of medical care surveyed were much
lower. For example, coverage for endoscopies, cardiac
catheterizations, and hospitalizations was ultimately
denied in fewer than 1 percent of cases. Coverage for
MRIs and surgical procedures was ultimately denied in 1
percent to 2 percent of cases. The study found that nation-
ally the two most widely used managed care techniques
reported by physicians were utilization review, which was
applied to an average of 59 percent of patients, and
discounted fees, which was applied to an average of 38
percent of patients.  The authors concluded that, while the
denial rate was low, it did not necessarily follow that
utilization review had no impact because it might have a
“deterrent or sentinel effect” and discourage physicians
from suggesting certain treatments. In addition, the
researchers found that, while coverage denial rates were
very low for most physicians, a few experienced substan-
tial denial rates. (The study could not determine what
percentage of the denials involved inappropriate treat-
ments.)
UnitedHealth Group recently announced that it will no
longer require doctors to seek preauthorization before
ordering tests, treatments, referrals, or hospitalizations,
and the chairman of the nation’s largest health insurer,
Aetna Inc., has said his company might move in the same
direction.48 While it is too early to conclude how much
impact such moves might have on the patient protection
debate, many analysts have noted that to be competitive
large insurers will still attempt to exert control over
physician behavior in a number of other ways.
MEDICAL NECESSITY:
WHO DECIDES? WHO IS LIABLE?
A key issue in the debate over how liability should be
split among the various parties involved in making
medical decisions and allocating medical resources has
to do with who has the power to decide which services
and technologies are “medically necessary” under a
group health plan. Instead of enumerating every possible
medical intervention that might be covered, most health
plan contracts refuse to cover services that are not
medically necessary or are experimental or investiga-
tional. Many (but not all) coverage disputes hinge on
arguments of medical necessity. Because medical
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knowledge and medical technology are expanding
rapidly (and economic and social conditions are con-
stantly changing), notions of what is “medically neces-
sary” will evolve in tandem.
While employers and insurers argue that they are
seeking to improve the quality of medical practice and
need flexibility in determining what they will pay for,
physician and consumer groups have argued that many
health care contracts give plan administrators and fiducia-
ries the power to arbitrarily and unilaterally define
“medical necessity.” For example, in 1997 senior officials
of the AMA and Florida Medical Association wrote a
letter to Aetna/U.S. Healthcare taking issue with con-
tracts that the managed care firm issued to physicians in
Florida and five other states. The letter enumerated a
series of complaints, including the following:
The definitions of “covered services” and “medically
necessary” give Aetna the final authority to determine
whether a service is “medically necessary” and
consequently, on whether it is “covered,” regardless
of whether the service would be considered “medi-
cally necessary” under accepted standards of medical
care. By inextricably intertwining “coverage” deci-
sions and “medical necessity” decisions, Aetna is
giving itself the ultimate power to supersede a physi-
cian’s determination regarding the necessity of
medical service and to deny even clearly needed
medical care. This is medical decision-making for
which plan administrators should be held liable.49
The contracts at issue stipulated that the insurer had
final say over what was covered and the authority to
adjust or deny payments for services; they also declared
that “all patient care and related decisions are the sole
responsibility of Provider and Company’s medical
management procedures, protocols and policies do not
dictate or control Provider’s clinical decisions with
respect to the medical care or treatment of Members.”
Employers and insurers argue that if government-
imposed external review procedures override their
ability to decide what is medically necessary in con-
tracts with physicians and in plan documents, their
ability to contain costs and standardize and improve the
practice of medicine will be impeded.
APPROACHES TO LIABILITY
Contract Law versus Tort Law
The law has evolved two general types of ap-
proaches to liability most relevant to the debate over
ERISA health plan and MCO/insurer liability: contract
liability and tort liability. Under principles of contract
law, courts typically will enforce agreements between
parties but generally limit remedies for breach of con-
tract to “the benefit of the bargain”—that is, to what the
plaintiff expected to receive from the agreement in the
first place. Plaintiffs generally cannot recover conse-
quential economic damages that were not within the
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the
contract was made (for example, unanticipated damages
caused by the loss of the originally bargained-for
benefit) or damages for emotional distress resulting from
a breach of contract or punitive damages. The civil
enforcement measures currently available to ERISA plan
participants under Section 502 basically follow the
contract liability model.50 In limiting liability, contract
law presumes that parties entering into private agree-
ments are in the best position to manage their own risks.
However, individuals in employee health plans, it might
be noted, are third-party beneficiaries of plans whose
terms they do not negotiate themselves and which they
are not in a position to readily understand.
Tort law, in contrast to contract law, reflects public
policies about how people and organizations should
behave toward one another. Designed to deter improper
or risky conduct, to compensate injured parties, and to
minimize the overall social cost of accidents, tort law
holds people to a standard of care that is determined by
legislative bodies or the courts. (Under the contract law
model, the terms of the contract can be set by the
contracting parties themselves.) Under tort law reme-
dies, plaintiffs may be compensated for all injuries
resulting from the defendant’s wrongful conduct,
including lost wages, medical expenses, and pain and
suffering. To deter wrongful behavior in the future,
courts may send a message by awarding punitive dam-
ages in tort cases.
As noted above, the patient protection bill passed by
the House would strip back ERISA preemption to allow
lawsuits based on state law and in some circumstances
would expose ERISA plan administrators, insurers, and
medical providers to tort remedies not currently avail-
able to plan participants. Though it would be difficult for
anyone to predict every possible new way that health
plans might be sued should the House version become
law, it seems reasonable to predict that liability would
increase with respect to medical care, insurance, and
administrative services functions performed under group
health plan contracts.
Insurance Industry Liability
With regard to the insurance industry, courts have
recognized a special cause of action for “bad faith”
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breaches of contracts and have permitted recovery of
consequential economic and punitive damages on top
of recovery of benefits promised in the contract.
According to J. Clark Kelso of the University of the
Pacific McGeorge School of Law:
The insurance bad faith cases are interesting because
they clearly impose tort liability for bad faith in the
handling of a claim under an insurance policy. The
law of insurance bad faith recognizes that the insur-
ance contract may create incentives for an insurance
company to deny claims even when there is no good
faith basis for denial and that the tort system may
serve to balance that incentive.51
Medical Malpractice Liability
Medical malpractice is another form of tort law
traditionally overseen at the state level. As noted above,
MCOs contracting with ERISA health plans in some
federal court jurisdictions already face increased risk of
suits based on the theory that they were indirectly
responsible for injuries caused by physicians under
their control. The House bill would seem to greatly
expand the likelihood of such lawsuits.
To what degree the current medical malpractice
liability system deters the frequency of medical injuries,
appropriately compensates injured patients, and unnec-
essarily adds costs are difficult issues that have been
debated by experts for many years. In order to win
medical malpractice damages, a person must prove in
court that he or she was injured as a result of a medical
service provider’s failure to adhere to a standard of
care. Malpractice claims can involve errors of commis-
sion (doing something negligently) or omission (such
as failing to diagnose a disease that a reasonably
competent physician should have diagnosed). Policy-
makers desiring more detail on the many issues that
medical malpractice law raises may want to read a
report written by Randall Bovbjerg of the Urban
Institute in 1995.52 Among the many findings in the
report are the following:
 About three-quarters of malpractice claims involve
care in hospitals and most of the rest care provided
in physicians’ offices.
 Liability insurance premiums averaged roughly 4
percent of physicians’ gross practice income.
 Courts compensated only a tiny fraction of patients
injured by the medical system, while the best studies
available showed evidence of a significant amount
of patient injury (occurring, for example, in about 5
percent of hospital medical records studied).
 Liability recoveries covered only a small portion of
the actual cost of malpractice injuries, most of which
was passed on in the form of more health care
treatments to employers, government programs, and
individuals themselves.
 The medical liability system has performed poorly as
a system of compensation and as a system of medical
oversight but may be more defensible if viewed as a
means of dispute resolution.
In response to pressure brought on by rapidly rising
malpractice insurance premiums, states in the 1970s and
1980s enacted a variety of reforms that, generally
speaking, either try to reduce the number of cases
brought, make it harder for plaintiffs to prevail, or
reduce damage awards. More than half the states have
placed limits on attorneys’ fees and capped damage
awards but no state has fundamentally altered the
underlying structure of the medical malpractice system.
CAUTIONS
Although many health policy analysts and research-
ers acknowledge that ERISA’s remedies are not ade-
quate to protect consumers in today’s medical and
insurance marketplace, many are also cautious about
expanding the use of the tort system in response. In a
recent article addressing injuries from medical error (as
differentiated from disputes over benefits administration
and coverage determinations) Bovbjerg and Robert H.
Miller warned that changes in liability law should
promote and not inhibit the management of health risks:
With regard to liability, the ideal is to have injury risk
imposed on those best able to control the costs of
injury plus the costs of injury avoidance;53 negligence
measured by the cost-effectiveness of alternative
precautions proven by evidence-based medicine rather
than expert testimony of medical custom;54 and dam-
ages structured to send good deterrent signals without
imposing unpredictable, open-ended liability.55 There
are substantial problems with the existing law of
malpractice in these regards, and backlash-generated
reform proposals do not even reach such issues.56
Another group of researchers who recently inter-
viewed several of the types of people involved in health
care delivery and administration in order to assess the
potential impact of expanded liability under ERISA have
also sounded a cautionary note.57 While finding that the
direct costs of expanded liability were “uncertain,”58
they concluded that the possible effects of such a reform
could have significant and unintended impacts on
coverage decision making, information exchange, risk
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contracting, and employers’ willingness to sponsor
coverage. Interestingly, the research team noted that
expanded liability for coverage decisions could spill
over onto physician groups and networks that have
accepted capitation and often make utilization review
decisions (thereby functioning in some instances as
both medical providers and ERISA fiduciaries).
Under the current legal structure, physician group
practices and MCOs may perform several functions for
an ERISA health plan simultaneously,59 and each of
these functions may be subject to different bodies of
law projecting different expectations of professional
behavior and disparate levels of consumer protection.
For example, a physician group practice assuming
insurance risk in an arrangement with a group health
plan may have an incentive to characterize avoidance
of expensive or high-risk treatments as “coverage
decisions” made in its role as an plan fiduciary (taking
advantage of the liability shield that ERISA affords) as
opposed to “medical decisions” for which the medical
group may be held to a far higher standard of behavior
should patient injury later be proven in court. 
POLICY OPTIONS
A general concern of many policymakers is that
reforms to ERISA remedies should not undercut the
ability of health care purchasers and MCOs to negotiate
with insurers and health care providers to contain the
growth of costs, improve medical quality, and reduce
medical error. Ideally, any such reform would legitimize
managed care in the eyes of consumers and at the same
time distribute liability for medical care and plan adminis-
tration decisions among those who actually take responsi-
bility for making those decisions, with their liability being
proportionate to the influence they exert. Unfortunately,
the ideal policy may not be possible. Coming up with an
alternative system has been extremely difficult, especially
because the issue has become highly politicized. So far at
least, legislators and interest groups have tended to take
highly polarized positions rather than reaching out to
compromise and explore practical options for reform.
In resolving the differences between the House and
Senate bills on remedies available to ERISA health plan
participants, congressional conferees face two major sets
of issues: (a) what type or blend of types of liability to
place on ERISA plan administrators and other fiduciaries
and (b) whether such remedies will be based in federal or
state law. In terms of substance, both the House and
Senate bills would add internal and external review
requirements to ERISA’s current “contract-law”-like
remedy of allowing participants to sue for the value of
denied benefits or the benefits themselves. The House bill
takes the extra step of opening up state-based tort reme-
dies, in part designed to encourage health plans to adhere
to the new external review requirements. Exposing the
administrators of multi-state employee health plans to up
to 50 variants of several types of tort actions, each with up
to 50 possible variants of standards of behavior for which
to be liable, certainly would seem to increase their level of
confusion and need to seek legal advice. Should the
conference committee decide that expanded liability is
desirable, a federal standard may be clearer and simpler
but also has drawbacks, such as less suitability to the
different market and social conditions in the states. Issues
of ease of access to the courts, court capacity to handle
new cases, and the competence of various types of courts
to handle health benefits cases would also seem to be
require some thought if the liability system is to be signifi-
cantly altered.
While contract and tort-type remedies represent distinct
approaches under the law, considering other approaches
may be instructive. In a recent paper, Kelso suggested that
policymakers look at how legislatures and courts have
fashioned the rules of liability for several industries:
professional services industries, including medical mal-
practice; employers’ liability for workplace injuries;
liability in the manufacturing industry; liability in the
insurance industry; and liability for wrongful termination.
In each instance, policymakers had to decide between
contract and tort models of liability and in some they
created blends of the two with special rules.
To assist policymakers in understanding the range of
options (without advocating any particular one), Kelso
presented five options for approaches to health plan
liability.60 These included
 Retaining the contract liability model but modifying
the contract through government regulations that,
among other things, might impose independent
review requirements; require disclosure of financial
incentives that might influence physician decisions;
or mandate the offering of types of benefits, proce-
dures, or access to providers or medical facilities.
 Creating a medical compensation fund along the
lines of the workers compensation system.
 Creating a medical malpractice model that is a hybrid
of tort and contract law.
 Exposing health plans to tort liability similar to that
faced by insurance companies for unreasonable and
bad faith claims practices.
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 Holding managed care companies liable for injuries
caused by all erroneous medical or coverage deci-
sions that contributed to the end result in a system of
enterprise liability (drawing on principles that have
evolved for product liability in manufacturing
industries).
The literature delving into many of these models is
extensive and beyond the scope of this paper. These
models are mentioned here primarily as illustrations of
policy options, some of which fall outside the bound-
aries of the current congressional debate over health
plan liability.
CONCLUSION
The civil enforcement scheme that Congress devel-
oped in ERISA 25 years ago is geared primarily toward
resolving disputes over pensions and is arguably no
longer adequate to protect plan participants making
claims for promised health benefits. Consumers injured
by a plan coverage decision have virtually no legal
remedy available to them. And no regulatory structure
is in place to compel an ERISA plan to provide a
promised medical benefit that was denied by a plan
fiduciary or to adequately assist consumers in doing so.
Driven in large part by a socially recognized need to
contain the growth of health care costs, the health care
industry has undergone fundamental changes. Plan
sponsors, insurers, and MCOs have attempted to
provide incentives for physicians to practice more
efficiently and, through utilization review programs and
other means, have attempted to influence what consti-
tutes appropriate medical practice. Shielding ERISA
plan sponsors and fiduciaries from legal liability, the
law leaves physicians exposed to malpractice liability.
To a still limited degree, it allows MCOs to be sued for
medical malpractice as well. Under the current legal
structure, ERISA plan fiduciaries—a list that may
include plan sponsors, insurers, MCOs, medical groups,
and others—have an incentive to characterize decisions
as “coverage decisions” as opposed to “medical deci-
sions” in order to protect themselves from liability
under state law, and in many instances the courts have
found the distinction difficult to draw. While consumer
demand for new medical technologies coupled with the
perception that insured health services are a “cost-free”
good promise to intensify cost pressures, plan sponsors
carry the burden of holding back the growth in costs. In
the long run, efforts to contain cost growth probably
will mean more intervention by purchasers in the
practice of medicine, either directly or through payment
incentives. Even though it may be beneficial to society
as a whole, this may lead to more patient injuries based
on medical care that was not provided (as contrasted to
injuries stemming from medical care that was provided
but should not have been, which continues to be a major
problem).
Congress is grappling with how to update ERISA’s
civil enforcement provisions to give consumers added
protections while accommodating the new ways of
administering and purchasing health coverage and
delivering medical care. Both the House and Senate
have passed bills that would significantly increase
regulatory requirements facing ERISA health plans, for
example by adding the requirements for internal and
external reviews of disputed coverage decisions. Con-
gressional conferrees face the question of whether these
new administrative requirements overlaid on ERISA’s
“contract-like” remedies (the approach taken by the
Senate) will give plan participants sufficient means to
challenge coverage decisions. The House has taken the
additional step of stripping back ERISA’s preemption
of state law to allow plan participants increased access
to state law remedies if they are injured as a conse-
quence of plan decisions.
Until recently, many health policy analysts and
senior health policy staff on Capitol Hill gave the
conferees little chance of coming to agreement, espe-
cially on a bill that might increase the liability faced by
ERISA plans, insurers, and MCOs. Recent statements
by the two leading Republican presidential candidates
that they could support some form of increased liability
may throw a different light on the prospect. As noted
above, Bush has said that he could support a federal
statute like the Texas liability law. Speaking before a
local business group in South Carolina, Sen. John
McCain (R-AZ) recently said he would support inde-
pendent review requirements coupled with a limited
court remedies (barring punitive damages, capping pain
and suffering awards, but posing no limits on economic
damages, including lost wages and future earnings). He
also emphasized tort reform.61
Of paramount interest to consumers is having timely
access to needed medical care. If they do suffer injury,
consumers arguably also could benefit from a system to
compensate them for losses. The medical malpractice
system compensates very few patients who suffer medical
injury but no compensation system has been developed to
replace it. In the House bill, the main value of exposing
plan administrators and other fiduciaries to punitive
damages seems to be to deter them from irresponsible
behavior and to provide an incentive to conform with new
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